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Abstract Picking up on the themes of ISP responsibility and trust raised by Raphael 
Cohen-Almagor, this paper discusses the problem of removing inappropriate content 
from the Internet. It suggests that an approach based on community involvement 
such as used by YouTube may be preferable to one that relies on artificial 
intelligence to detect inappropriate content. The paper also suggests ways in which 
ISPs could help increase trust in the Internet by strengthening security. 
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Raphael Cohen-Almagor raises important issues regarding trust and responsibility on 
the Internet, especially as they relate to ISPs and content providers. His main point is 
that ISPs should take responsibility for the content posted on their servers and that 
doing so will promote trust. I will first discuss the issue of ISP responsibility and 
then discuss the issue of trust. 
Cohen-Almagor wants ISPs to take responsibility for content on their servers and 
to prohibit material that violates laws and social norms, removing it when it appears. 
He argues that an ISP is not much like a phone company, and so the reasons for not 
holding phone companies responsible for the content of phone calls do not apply to 
ISPs. He says that better analogies are to bookstores and libraries, which generally 
do manage their holdings responsibly. Yet, these analogies are also deficient. 
Whereas bookstore owners and librarians select the materials they place on their 
shelves, ISPs merely provide storage space and communication channels. They do 
not select or post most of the content that appears on the sites they manage. Rather, 
the materials are posted by the owners and users of the sites. In that sense, ISPs are 
more like landlords who have leased space to a bookstore or library. Under normal 
conditions, landlords do not just barge into a tenant's space and toss out books. 
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Unless someone reports a problem, they are unlikely to even know what books are 
housed in their buildings. 
ISPs have generally adopted an approach of removing inappropriate content after 
it is reported to them, rather than screening each new item or constantly searching 
for content that violates laws and policies. Part of the reason for this is that it is less 
costly than scanning everything. It is also more reliable than using software to 
distinguish acceptable from unacceptable content. Although artificial intelligence has 
advanced considerably, it is still limited in its capabilities. Software designed to 
detect objectionable content would almost certainly miss some items even as it 
generated numerous false alarms. But, another reason for following the reporting 
approach is that it limits the liability of the ISPs. If they are not expected to actively 
monitor everything posted on their servers, they cannot be sued for failing to block 
an item in the first place. They can only be held liable for failing to take action after 
the objectionable content has been brought to their attention. Without this limited 
liability, ISPs may be reluctant to provide services that are difficult to control. This 
was a big issue in the early days of the Web with respect to copyright violations. 
ISPs did not want to be held liable when pirated materials were uploaded to or 
swapped through a server they operated. However, they have accepted responsibility 
for removing said content after it is reported to them. 
YouTube offers an excellent model for how content providers can effectively 
monitor their po stings without incurring prohibitive costs or relying on software to 
correctly label content. The model is based on community involvement. When a 
member sees a video that appears to violate YouTube's community guidelines, the 
person can report the video by clicking on a nearby flag icon. 1 The icon opens up a 
menu that lets the person select a reason for flagging the video, for example, the 
video is hateful, violent, or pornographic. YouTube reports that they review flagged 
videos 24 h a day, and that most are reviewed within an hour. With a worldwide 
community of over 280 million users, YouTube is able to leverage their community 
to review the hundreds of millions of videos that are watched daily. More than 13 h 
of video are uploaded onto YouTube every minute-a rate that would make reliable, 
real-time detection extremely difficult. 
Other sites have built on the service provided by YouTube to get objectionable 
content removed from YouTube. The Stop Internet Terrorists blog,2 for example, 
provides a link to terrorist videos that have been posted to YouTube. The videos 
show the brutal killing of US and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, in 
violation of YouTube's standards. Readers of the blog are encouraged to flag the 
videos for its violent content. 
Turning now to the issue of trust, Cohen-Almagor observes that to foster trust on the 
Internet, it is necessary to cultivate social responsibility. He then focuses on social 
responsibility relative to content that violates laws or social norms. But, there is another 
area where ISPs could take greater responsibility, and that relates to security. 
Security-or rather the lack thereof-is one of the main reasons why users do not 
trust the Internet. They are afraid that their identities will be compromised and credit 
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cards stolen. They worry that their computers will pick up viruses, worms, Trojans, 
spyware, and other forms of malicious software when they open email attachments, 
click on links, or visit websites. They are concerned that their computers will be 
compromised and conscripted into a "botnet"-a network of compromised 
computers under someone else's control. 
There are several steps that ISPs could do strengthen security on the Internet. For 
starters, they could make sure that their connections to their customers are secure, 
and that passwords and other sensitive information are not transmitted in the clear. In 
addition, ISPs could block attack packets and packets from infected computers. They 
could notifY customers whose machines are compromised and being used to send out 
spam and engage in illegal activity, and they could help those customers recover 
from the breach. They could help shut down botnets by disrupting their command 
and control channels or by blocking traffic from the compromised machines. They 
could limit spam and traffic floods caused by denial-of-service attacks. ISPs, in fact, 
often do help close off attack streams, especially when the attacks are affecting their 
own services or are particularly damaging. However, they frequently let low-level 
attacks persist rather than incurring the costs of shutting them down and dealing with 
complaints from customers whose traffic has been blocked. 
ISPs in Australia have adopted a new industry code for dealing with security 
problems. They can temporarily quarantine compromised computers in a "walled 
garden with links to relevant resources that will assist them until they are able to 
restore the security of their machine.',3 They can restrict the outbound email from 
computers that are sending out spam. They are to report cyber attacks against their 
infrastructures, the infrastructures of their customers, and critical infrastructures to 
law enforcement officials. 
Content providers also have responsibilities for protecting sensitive information 
stored on their servers, such as customer data, financial information, health records, 
private email, and intellectual property. Yet, hundreds of millions of credit cards 
have been stolen from servers that were inadequately protected, along with countless 
amounts of other personal and corporate information. Even Google's systems were 
vulnerable, and the service provider withdrew its search engine site in China after 
learning that China had infiltrated its network and downloaded the em ails of human 
rights activists in China as well as Google's own intellectual property. Google also 
objected to the censorship demands placed on ISPs operating in China. 
Although the security issues go beyond the scope of Cohen-Almagor's interesting 
paper, they nevertheless need to be included in a broad effort to increase trust on the 
Internet. There are other trust issues as well, including privacy, social networking, 
Internet scams, and false information. Addressing all these issues is important as we 
move forward. 
3Brian Prince, "Australian ISPs Adopt Industry Security Standard," eWeek, June 9, 2010. 
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